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I. INTRODUCTION 
Japan’s March 2011 triple disaster—first a large earthquake, 
followed by a massive tsunami and a nuclear meltdown—caused a 
devastating loss of life, damaged and destroyed property, and left hundreds 
of thousands of people homeless, hurt, and in need.1 This article looks at the 
effort to address the financial needs of the victims of the 3/11 disaster by 
examining the role of public and private actors in providing compensation, 
describing the types of groups and individuals for whom compensation is 
available, and analyzing the range of institutions through which 
compensation has been allocated. The story is in some ways cause for 
optimism—billions of dollars have been spent compensating millions of 
individuals and businesses, in most cases through extra-judicial channels 
that have minimized the need for protracted, expensive litigation. But this 
article also reveals a compensation structure that excludes large numbers of 
potential claims by privileging the losses of nuclear accident victims over 
those of earthquake and tsunami victims; describes a system in which those 
potentially eligible for compensation must navigate an overly complex 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. JD, Ph.D., University 
of California, Berkeley. Support for this paper was generously provided by a University of 
Pennsylvania Law School Summer Research Grant. Research assistance was provided by 
James Klima and the staff of Penn Law’s library, especially Timothy Von Dulm. Invaluable 
comments were provided by Professor Eri Osaka. Yoko Okado kindly assembled the 
litigation data in the appendix. 
1 NATURAL DISASTER AND NUCLEAR CRISIS IN JAPAN: RESPONSE AND RECOVERY 
AFTER JAPAN'S 3/11 (Jeff Kingston, ed., 2012). 
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institutional matrix for pursuing their claims; and discusses an increasing 
amount of litigation by individuals and groups within and beyond Japan that 
has clouded the compensation landscape. In short, post-Fukushima 
compensation is both laudable and lamentable, relying upon arbitrary 
distinctions between deserving and undeserving victims and leaving many 
victims unpaid and discontent; but also succeeding in managing a large 
number of claims. 
II. CLASSIFYING DISASTERS AND DISASTER VICTIMS 
Mass disasters are a risk for citizens everywhere, and in the wake of 
such disasters many people suffer significant losses of property and physical 
harm.2 As a result, almost every country in the world, and many 
transnational organizations, have confronted the question of how they 
should manage the personal injuries and property losses suffered by the 
victims of mass disasters. That question invites at least three important 
distinctions. First, we need to be clear about what we mean by a disaster 
and how disasters differ from accidents. It is easy to illustrate the latter: two 
cars colliding constitute an accident; a bridge full of cars that collapses due 
to an earthquake is a disaster. However, beyond the idea that one knows a 
disaster when confronted with a disaster, there is no widely accepted 
definition of the term. Indeed, a manual compiled for use by FEMA in a class 
entitled Hazards, Disasters and U.S. Emergency Management: An 
Introduction, includes sixty-six definitions of disaster, but does not settle on 
any of them.3 Despite the lack of a clear definition, most people working in 
the disaster field agree that for something to constitute a disaster it needs to 
affect a ‘large’ number of people and cause a ‘substantial’ amount of harm.4 
That definition, despite its vagueness, is widely utilized by those in the 
disaster field, and is the one used in this article.  
The second important distinction is that although disasters may be 
similar in terms of their impact (they affect many people and cause 
substantial harm), disasters differ with regard to their causes and 
characteristics. Some disasters arise from distinctly natural causes, such as 
heat waves or floods; others are caused by human agency, such as the 
                                                 
2 It should be noted that those losses, though not predictable, are often not random; 
they fall disproportionately on those who were already economically disadvantaged. See 
e.g. Bob Bolin, Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Disaster Vulnerability, in HANDBOOK OF 
DISASTER RESEARCH (H. Rodrigeuz et al. eds., 2006); Paul Mohai et al, Environmental 
Justice, 34 ANN. REV. ENVT. & RESOURCES 405 (2009).  
3 Wayne Blanchard, Appendix: Select Emergency Management-Related Terms & 
Definitions (July 28, 2006), available at 
https://training.fema.gov/hiedu/docs/hazdem/appendix%20-%20select%20em-
related%20terms%20and%20definitions.doc (compiled for use in the FEMA Emergency 
Management Higher Education Project working draft course Hazards, Disasters and U.S. 
Emergency Management: An Introduction) 
4 DISASTER LAW AND POLICY (Daniel Farber et al., eds., 2nd ed. 2009). 
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Chernobyl nuclear accident. Of course, the line distinguishing the two is 
often thin, since many natural disasters are at least in part the result of 
human agency. A tsunami may be a natural event, for example, but the harm 
it causes to human communities results as least in part from the decision to 
build communities near the sea. Likewise, it can be difficult to differentiate 
natural disasters from technological disasters.5 To the extent that sorting 
disasters by type is possible, it raises the question of whether that sorting 
should be relevant to compensation. Should victims of floods, for example, 
be compensated but not victims of fires? Should compensation be provided 
to victims of earthquakes but not tsunamis, or perhaps to victims of nuclear 
disasters but not to victims of natural disasters? 
The third key distinction focuses not on the nature of disasters but 
on the nature of victims. There are, of course, a wide range of people who 
suffer physical harm and property loss as the result of some misfortune, 
including the terminally ill, victims of automobile crashes, those who catch 
dangerous infectious diseases, and patients who have adverse reactions to 
medications or medical procedures. Disaster victims are thus only a subset 
of a larger class. Should they be treated differently from victims of other 
types of misfortunes and accidents? Should countries be distinguishing 
between deserving and undeserving victims? How should countries deal 
with victims of bad luck, or victims who in some sense caused their own 
harm? In short, do disaster victims have a special claim to society’s 
resources, or should they be compensated if, and only if, the usual rules of 
tort law, like fault-based liability, can be satisfied?  
These are not new questions or new distinctions. In fact, they have 
been debated for centuries. But that debate has rarely led to a decisive policy 
approach to disaster management. As a result, when the inevitable disaster 
strikes, nations are left scrambling for ad hoc solutions to extraordinarily 
complex problems with huge moral and financial implications. That is 
precisely the position Japan found itself in on March 11, 2011, when it was 
jolted by a huge earthquake, inundated by a massive tsunami, and showered 
with radiation from a nuclear accident.  
III. FUKUSHIMA: BACKGROUND 
Japan’s experience with the Fukushima disaster is a prime example 
of what happens when government regulators fail to carefully plan for the 
inevitable occurrence of a disaster. It is also a poignant illustration of the 
distinctions discussed in the preceding paragraphs. For example, while 
Fukushima was clearly a disaster, was it a triple-disaster, as so many have 
called it, or a single disaster?6 That may seem like a purely academic 
                                                 
5 The 3/11 Fukushima nuclear meltdown, for example, was the product of an 
earthquake and a tsunami, which makes it difficult to think of the nuclear accident as a 
purely technological disaster. 
6 Elizabeth Ferris and Mireya Solís, Lessons from Japan's Triple Disaster: Three 
Years On, BROOKINGS UP-FRONT (March 10, 2014, 11:53 AM), 
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question, but it has important consequences. If 3/11 was a triple disaster—
earthquake + tsunami + nuclear meltdown—then there were three groups of 
victims, and that invites drawing distinctions between them. Perhaps the 
victims of the earthquake should be treated differently than the victims of 
the tsunami, or the victims of the tsunami should be treated differently than 
those of the nuclear meltdown. On the other hand, if Fukushima was a single 
disaster—perhaps because one does not think the causes or consequences 
of the three events can be successfully disentangled—then there is only one 
group of victims and distinguishing between individual victims will require 
criteria that engage the qualities of the victims rather than the qualities of 
the disaster. 
The Japanese government confronted the question of whether to 
treat the disaster singularly or jointly early on, and it quickly decided that 
Fukushima was a triple disaster, not a singular disaster. The reason for doing 
so had little to do with its investigation of the geological or technological 
causes of the accident. Indeed, conceptually, it is a bit difficult to appreciate 
the scientific reasoning behind such a decision—the earthquakes and 
tsunamis are inherently intertwined, and the meltdown was their direct 
result—but economically the decision made perfect sense. 
Treating Fukushima as a single disaster meant that an enormous 
pool of victims might potentially confront the Japanese Government, 
demanding compensation. Victims could organize, lobby, politic, and 
demand recompense in huge numbers—almost 20,000 people killed and 
over 200,000 displaced—with the potential to exert enormous pressure on 
the government.7 By considering Fukushima a triple disaster, the 
government created three groups of victims—those harmed by the 
earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident—making it more difficult for the 
victims to organize as a single group. The triple disaster designation 
additionally enabled the state to split victims into those ‘deserving’ and 
‘undeserving’ of compensation. There was nothing sinister about the 
government’s approach. It was, in essence, a business decision that took 
into account the high volume of potential claimants and determined that it 
was probably not financially possible for the government to provide them 
all with a meaningful amount of compensation from the general fisc.  
                                                 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/03/11-japan-triple-disaster-ferris-
solis.  
7 As of April 10, 2015, 15,891 people were killed and 2,579 were missing. 127,833 
properties suffered total collapse, while 275,791 suffered half collapse. DAMAGE 
SITUATION AND POLICE COUNTERMEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH 2011 TOHOKU DISTRICT – 
OFF THE PACIFIC OCEAN EARTHQUAKE, National Police Agency of Japan (April 10, 2015), 
http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo_e.pdf. Nearly 290,000 people were 
still living in shelters two and a half years after the disaster. Preston Phro, Nearly 290,000 
People Still Living in Shelters 2 ½ Years After Tohoku Disaster, JAPAN TODAY (Sep. 18, 
2013, 6:51 AM), http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/view/nearly-290000-
people-still-living-in-shelters-2-12-years-after-tohoku-disaster.  
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There were other equally difficult questions confronting the 
Japanese government in the aftermath of the 3/11 disasters. One was 
whether Fukushima was exclusively a disaster, or a disaster in addition to 
an accident, a question which raises the issue of the foreseeability of the 
nuclear meltdown and the possibility of culpable parties. A second question 
was the nature of the disaster and whether it was a ‘normal’ disaster or a 
‘grave natural disaster,’ a determination with serious implications for the 
liability of the owner/operator of the nuclear facility. Both of those 
questions will be addressed later in this article.  
IV. JAPAN’S NUCLEAR LIABILITY SYSTEM 
When Japan began its move toward nuclear energy in the 1950s and 
1960s, it mimicked the international liability standards for nuclear incidents 
evolving in other nations. Those standards were articulated in discussions 
preceding the ratification of the first international treaty addressing nuclear 
accidents: the OECD’s Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the 
Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris Convention), adopted in 1960 by various 
nations in Western Europe.8 The Convention focused on cross-border harms 
and was triggered when a nuclear incident occurred in a nation that ratified 
the agreement and caused damage in another ratifying nation.9 Soon after it 
was adopted, the Paris Convention was supplemented by the Brussels 
(Supplementary) Convention of 1963, which established a system whereby 
all signatories of the Paris Convention would use public money to 
contribute to a compensation fund if the funds set aside under the Paris 
Convention were inadequate.10 The key principles of the Paris and Brussels 
Conventions are:  
                                                 
8 See Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability, July 29, 1960, available 
at https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/paris-convention.html (last reviewed November 7, 2014) 
(providing background information and status of ratifications and accessions) [Hereinafter 
Paris Convention]. 
9 See Christophe Bernasconi, Civil Liability Resulting from Transfrontier 
Environmental Damage: A Case for Hague Conference?, Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, Preliminary Document No. 8, at 5 (April 2000), 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gen_pd8e.pdf (providing an overview of the Paris and 
Vienna Conventions); INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, THE 1997 VIENNA 
CONVENTION ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE AND THE 1997 CONVENTION ON 
SUPPLEMENTARY COMPENSATION FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE: EXPLANATORY TEXTS (2004), 
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/Documents/gc48inf-5expltext.pdf 
(providing background to the Paris and Vienna Conventions and the motivation driving 
their implementation). 
10 See Anthony Adisianya, Different Compensation Systems Under Nuclear 
Liability Conventions, The Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy 
(May 16, 2011), http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/?news=31321 (comparing 
different nuclear liability regimes on issues of coverage, liability limitations, and the 
relevance of national law). 
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 nations are obligated to provide compensation in the event of 
death, personal injury, or property loss caused by a nuclear 
accident occurring in a nuclear facility or during the transport 
of nuclear substances to or from a nuclear facility; 
 operators of nuclear facilities are strictly liable for the harms 
that result from nuclear accidents, and victims do not have to 
demonstrate that the owners/operators were at fault (victims are 
not relieved of the need to prove causation);  
 the liability of operators is capped, so that their obligation to 
pay compensation regardless of fault has a clear financial 
ceiling;  
 claims are governed by a statute of limitations that expires after 
ten years;  
 operators must maintain insurance or other financial security to 
cover their mandated liability limits;  
 governments can make up the difference if operators 
experience a shortfall;  
 compensation is paid regardless of a victim’s nationality, 
domicile, or residence.  
 
In 2004, both the Paris and Brussels Conventions were amended and 
liability limits were increased. Under the amendments (not yet in force as 
of May 2015), victims of nuclear accidents are guaranteed a €1.5 billion 
compensation fund, with €700 million paid by the owner/operator of the 
facility, €500 million paid by the state where the accident occurred, and 
€300 million paid from the pool of funds contributed by members of the 
Convention.11 
Although Japan is not a signatory to the Paris or Brussels 
Conventions, the Japanese government appreciated the need for a structured 
compensation fund for victims of nuclear accidents. Such funds, in Japan 
and elsewhere, were part of a broad policy bargain between governments, 
power companies, and the public: governments needed cleaner, cheaper 
energy; companies were keen to enter a new, profitable energy sector; and 
the public wanted cheaper energy but was concerned about the risks of 
nuclear reactors, particularly after the use of atomic bombs in WWII. To 
calm public concerns, governments crafted compensation policies in the 
event of a nuclear accident.12 Risk was privatized by imposing strict, no-
                                                 
11 See NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, 2004 Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention, 
https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/paris-convention-protocol.html (last updated Mar. 18, 
2014) (providing background information on the Protocol).  
12 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 85-296, at 8 (1957) (describing the “basic approach” of 
the Joint Committee responsible for the 1957 Price-Anderson Act as “[determining] the 
amount of financial protection which the licensee for reactors must have to protect the 
public against nuclear incidents.”); Paris Convention supra note 8 (“Desirous of ensuring 
adequate and equitable compensation for persons who suffer damage caused by nuclear 
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fault liability on the owners/operators of nuclear power plants, but also 
socialized by using public funds to ‘fill the gap’ between the mandated 
private insurance of the industry and the actual cost of an accident.13  
Japan’s legal framework for nuclear compensation, the Nuclear 
Damage Compensation Act of 1961 (NDCA), owes much to the Paris and 
Brussels Conventions.14 The NDCA makes nuclear power plant operators 
strictly liable for nuclear accidents and requires that they financially secure 
their liability with JPY 120 billion (JPY 5 billion in 1961, later increased to 
JPY 120 billion) of private insurance as well as through an indemnity 
agreement with the government.15 Because the law releases insurers from 
liability in the event that an earthquake or other natural disaster causes a 
nuclear accident, the victims of the 3/11 nuclear disaster were compensated 
by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) through funds raised by 
the indemnity contract with the state. The law also releases nuclear facility 
operators from liability if a nuclear accident is caused by a ‘grave natural 
disaster.’ Although TEPCO, the owner/operator of the troubled Fukushima 
reactors, argued that the 3/11 earthquake-tsunami-nuclear meltdown 
constituted a ‘grave natural disaster,’ the Japanese government was clearly 
not interested in releasing the company from liability. It rejected the view 
that a ‘grave natural disaster’ had occurred, and instead proceeded under the 
provisions of the NDCA.16 
As odd as it may sound, those in the Fukushima area whose losses 
are legally considered to have been caused by the nuclear accident are 
perhaps the most ‘fortunate’ of the large pool of people who suffered, and 
continue to suffer, in the aftermath of the 3/11 disaster. The great majority 
                                                 
incidents whilst taking the necessary steps to ensure that the development of the production 
and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is not thereby hindered.”). 
13 For a discussion on how the use of public funds has diverged over time, see 
Michael G. Faure & Tom Vanden Borre, Compensating Nuclear Damage: A Comparative 
Economic Analysis of the U.S. and International Liability Schemes, 33 WILLIAM & MARY 
ENVT’L L. & POL’Y REV. 219 (2008). 
14 [Nuclear Damage Compensation Act], Act No. 147 of 1961. 
15 Eric Feldman, Fukushima: Catastrophe, Compensation, and Justice in Japan, 
62 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 341 (2013) (citing [Nuclear Damage Compensation Act], Act No. 
147 of 1961, §§3, 7 (Japan), available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/japan-
docs/Japan-Nuclear-Damage-Compensation-Act.pdf). See also NUCLEAR ENERGY 
AGENCY, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PUB. NO. 
7089, JAPAN’S COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE: AS RELATED TO THE 
TEPCO FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR ACCIDENT 11 (2012), available at 
http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/fukushima/7089-fukushima-compensation-system-pp.pdf 
[Hereinafter “JAPAN’S COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE (OECD)”]. 
16 Feldman, supra note 15, at 343 (citing Masayuki Murayama, There are Few 
Cases Around Here: Lawyers’ Response to Nuclear Compensation and Structural 
Problems of the Japanese Legal Profession (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author)). 
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of the damage caused by the Fukushima disaster was due to the earthquake 
and/or tsunami—the almost 20,000 deaths, the hundreds of thousands of 
destroyed buildings, the massive loss of crops and other businesses.17 Yet 
those whose lives were taken or shattered by the events of 3/11 have few 
options when it comes to compensation. There is no structured 
compensation program for disaster victims generally in Japan, no specific 
program or legislation provides more than token compensation to victims 
of earthquakes or tsunamis, and there is no mandatory insurance (and often 
no available insurance) for those who live in disaster-prone areas.18 It is 
therefore crucial to remember that compensation is available only for a 
relatively small subset of Fukushima victims—those whose harms can be 
causally linked to the nuclear accident. Of course that group includes a large 
number of people, but it is a relatively small percentage of those who 
experienced significant loss from the disaster of March 11, 2011. 
Structured, no-fault systems are not the only way for disaster victims 
to deal with their harms. The cost of treating most personal injuries is 
covered in whole or in part by Japan’s generous social insurance system, 
which provides high quality medical care for a relatively modest fee. For 
care not covered by that system, and for other costs like damaged or 
destroyed property, individuals can sue one or all of the potentially 
responsible parties—TEPCO, the government, the manufacturers of the 
nuclear power plant equipment, and any other solvent party who might be 
found to have been the cause of their harms.19 Although such remedies are 
available, litigation is generally a long, expensive, and emotionally draining 
experience. This means that the absence of a compensation system for so 
many Fukushima victims is a loss that is not easily remedied. 
                                                 
17 More than 90% of the deaths were caused by the tsunami, and almost all of the 
remaining deaths were caused by the earthquake.  
18 The Act for the Payment of Solatia for Disasters provides JPY 5 million to 
families that lose their main wage earner to a disaster, and JPY 2.5 million in the event of 
the loss of the non-primary breadwinner. See 
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/bunya/seikatsuhogo/saigaikyujo4.html. Disaster victims can 
receive JPY 3 million under the Act Concerning Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods 
of Disaster Victims. See http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/seikatsusaiken/shiensya.html.  
19 Articles 4(1) and 4(3) of the NDCA suggest that only nuclear operators are liable 
for the harm caused by nuclear accidents (“…no person other than the nuclear operator 
who is liable for the damage pursuant to the preceding section shall be liable for the 
damage.”). Opinions vary as to whether or not that eliminates the possibility of suing 
equipment manufactures or the government over Fukushima-related nuclear harms, but 
most commentators believe that manufacturers cannot be sued whereas the government can 
be a defendant (personal communication with Professor Eri Osaka). So far, no court 
decisions have addressed these questions. Of course, lawsuits that might fail in Japanese 
courts may meet greater success outside of Japan. See the discussion of Cooper et al v. 
Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc., Docket No. 3:12-cv-03032 (S.D. Cal., filed Dec 21, 
2012), in Section V.C below.  
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V. COMPENSATING FUKUSHIMA’S NUCLEAR MELTDOWN VICTIMS 
Individuals whose harms were caused by the nuclear meltdown can 
seek compensation in three ways.20 The first, called the ‘direct’ route to 
compensation, is shaped by guidelines issued by the Dispute Reconciliation 
Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation and is meant to address the 
bulk of losses caused by the nuclear accident.21 The second, alternative 
dispute resolution (“ADR”), was set up under the auspices of the Ministry 
of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT), and 
focuses on compensating categories of people not included in the 
guidelines, including children, the disabled, and pregnant women.22 The 
third is litigation.  
A. TEPCO’S ‘Direct’ Compensation 
The complexity of the direct route to compensation, provided for in 
the NDCA, is well illustrated by Chart 1 (created by the OECD to explain 
the funding and operation of the system). Since 2011, TEPCO has issued 
more than 70 press releases addressing claimant eligibility, institutional 
architecture, financing, and other aspects of the system, which makes it 
extremely difficult to provide a crisp, accurate summary of how the 
compensation system operates.23 What follows is therefore a general 
description and overview of the direct compensation system.  
 
  
                                                 
20 The provisions of the NDCA were applied to Fukushima through the Act on 
Emergency Measures Related to Damage Caused by the 2011 Nuclear Accident (Law No. 
91 of 2011) which focused on enabling provisional payments in light of the uncertainties 
in assessing long-term damages. Financing was enabled through the Nuclear Damage 
Compensation Facilitation Corporation Act (Law No.94 of 2011), which covers any 
nuclear operator unable to bear the financial burden of compensation. 
21 For a collection of the Guidelines issued by the Dispute Reconciliation 
Committee, see JAPAN’S COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE (OECD), supra 
note 15, at 89-184. 
22 Feldman, supra note 15, at 351-52. 
23 Latest Press Release, WWW.TEPCO.CO.JP, 
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/comp/index-e.html (last visited May 7, 2015). 
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Chart 1: Overview of the Nuclear Damage Compensation System24 
Because the NDCA does not distinguish between compensable and 
non-compensable harms and lacks specifics on how much compensation 
should be provided to victims of nuclear accidents, the government 
convened a blue-ribbon committee of elite jurists, medical experts, and 
others, in the immediate aftermath of the Fukushima disaster and charged it 
with developing compensation guidelines.25 After five months of meetings, 
the committee announced Interim Guidelines in August 2011, and over the 
next thirty months made more specific compensation recommendations for 
victims whose damages were caused by voluntary evacuation and 
prolonged evacuation, victims whose financial losses were caused by 
reputational harm (e.g., people who were fearful of food and agricultural 
product contamination), and for other categories of victims.26 The 
committee’s guidelines are not binding on TEPCO, but the fact that the 
committee included a number of highly regarded jurists with experience 
                                                 
24 JAPAN’S COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE (OECD), supra note 
15, at 88. 
25 Joel Rhueben, Government Liability for Regulatory Failure in the Fukushima 
Disaster: A Common Law Comparison, 23 PACIFIC RIM L. & POL’Y J. 113, 121 (2014). 
For a complete list of members, see 
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/meibo/1353534.htm. 
26 See supra note 19. 
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working on issues related to nuclear energy, including Waseda University 
President (and former Law School Dean) Kaoru Kamata and Gakushuin 
University legal scholars Yoshihisa Noumi (committee chair) and Toyohiro 
Nomura, gave the committee’s recommendations a significant degree of 
heft. Additionally, as the recommendations hewed closely to principles and 
distinctions based on Japanese tort law, they benefited from having face 
validity as a way of handling personal injury claims resulting from the 
Fukushima disaster.  
The committee’s guidelines, operationalized by a ten-thousand-
person bureaucracy created by TEPCO to manage the claims process, take 
as their primary goal the provision of compensation for harms suffered by 
those required to evacuate the area contaminated by the Fukushima 
meltdown.27 Compensable harms include evacuation expenses and 
relocation costs; physical harm; pain and suffering; emotional distress; lost 
or decreased property value; damage to business; lost income; 
decontamination costs; and other related harms.28 Those whose homes were 
outside of the mandatory evacuation zone established by the government 
were initially left out of the compensation scheme, but they were eventually 
made eligible for less generous compensation than that provided to those 
who faced mandatory evacuation.29 Due to the profound uncertainty about 
the severity of nuclear contamination, and the length of time evacuees 
would be prohibited from returning to their homes, administrators struggled 
to calculate the full extent of damages experienced by claimants. As a result, 
many awards were considered provisional, interim payments, and claimants 
were told that they would have to seek compensation again at some time in 
the future.30 Ultimately, however, guidelines were established for 
determining whether and when people would be able to return to their 
homes, and a set of criteria was created to govern the valuation of temporary 
and permanent property loss.31  
                                                 
27 TEPCO’s specific compensation guidelines for individuals and businesses can 
be found at http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-
com/release/betu11_e/images/110830e19.pdf; and http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-
com/release/betu11_e/images/110921e13.pdf. 
28 Eri Osaka, Corporate Liability, Government Liability, and the Fukushima 
Nuclear Disaster, 21 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL 433, 439 (2012). 
29 Feldman, supra note 15, at 354 (citing Gov't Panel Sets N-Payment Scope, 
Amounts, DAILY YOMIURI ONLINE (Dec. 8, 2011), 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/nationalIT11207005778.htm). 
30 Rheuben, supra note 25, at 120 (citing Nikkei Shimbun,Keikaku hinan mo kari-
barai Kin Baishō1-settai 100-man en (KeisanshōtoTōden chōsei) [Provisional 
Compensation of JPY 1 million per Household for Designated Evacuees (METIand 
TEPCO’s agreement)], Apr. 12, 2011 (on file with author)). 
31 See Feldman, supra note 15, at 347-48. 
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Not surprisingly, both the administrative features of TEPCO’s 
compensation system and the substantive guidelines that animate its 
compensation decisions generated a significant amount of controversy. 
Some of the earliest conflicts focused on the procedures created for 
claimants to seek recompense. For example, victims, many of whom had 
been evacuated from their homes and were living in temporary shelters, 
were required to fill out and submit (in person or by mail, not online) a 
complex, 60-page claim form.32 The form, seen as either a conscious effort 
to disincentivize claims or a sign that those in charge of the compensation 
scheme failed to appreciate the burden such a form imposed on potential 
claimants, generated a great deal of unhappiness, and it was quickly 
shortened to a more manageable length. Other objections quickly followed. 
For example, some potentially eligible claimants opposed TEPCO’s 
involvement in the compensation process. They pointed out that there was 
a ‘fox guarding the henhouse’ problem in entrusting the compensation 
process to the party they believed to be responsible for their harms, and they 
refused to seek compensation so as to not put themselves at the mercy of 
TEPCO.33 
Debate also erupted over the types of injuries that can be 
compensated under the guidelines, as well as over the amount of 
compensation offered.34 Determining the ‘right’ amount of compensation 
for property damage, for example, generated considerable controversy. In 
some cases victims were able to return home relatively quickly, whereas in 
certain heavily contaminated areas people may never be able to reoccupy 
their homes. To some, it was clear that the value of such a loss should be 
calculated based upon the market value of the property, while others 
believed that replacement cost was the better measure of value.35 
Compensation for emotional distress has also been contentious.36 Under the 
guidelines, payments for emotional distress depend upon whether one’s 
                                                 
32 Osaka, supra note 28, at 441. 
33 Daniel A. Dorfmana, The Changing Perspectives of U.S. And Japanese Nuclear 
Energy Policies in the Aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi Disaster, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 255, 260 (2012). 
34 Rheuben, supra note 25, at 123. 
35 This question has been the subject of debate between the Dispute Reconciliation 
Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation and the Agency for Natural Resources and 
Energy of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry. I thank Professor Eri Osaka for 
bringing this debate to my attention.  
36 See, e.g., TEPCO Rushes to Terminate Compensation for Fukushima Victims, 
JAPAN PRESS WEEKLY (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.japan-
press.co.jp/modules/news/index.php?id=5117; Press Release, Tokyo Electric Power 
Company, Compensation for Mental Damage Due to Evacuation etc. (Increase of 
Compensation Amounts for People in Situations Such as Requiring Long-Term Care) 
(January 17, 2014), available at http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-
com/release/2014/1233808_5892.html. 
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evacuation was mandatory or voluntary and when one will be able to return 
to one’s home. Most payments for emotional distress are made on a monthly 
basis and are set at 100,000-120,000 yen per month, though some payments 
are considerably lower.37 In some cases, payments are made for a specified 
number of months, while in others payments are made in a lump sum.38  
From the perspective of tort law in the United States, such stand-
alone, regularized emotional distress claims are notable. In most U.S. 
jurisdictions, emotional distress claims are individualized, and emotional 
distress awards require that claimants experience or reasonably fear a 
physical injury or witness tortious, serious injury to a family member. Under 
the Japanese Civil Code, however, stand-alone payments for emotional 
distress are generally permissible.39 In the aftermath of the Fukushima 
disaster, it became clear to those involved in the compensation process that 
emotional distress payments would be critical to those suffering from the 
nuclear meltdown, since they did not experience immediate physical harm 
but instead had their lives destabilized because they lost their jobs, their 
homes, and their communities.40  
It is no surprise that the most devastating nuclear accident in Japan’s 
history has led to criticism of the government, of TEPCO, and of the 
seemingly too-cozy relationship between them. Surely some of the criticism 
is deserved, given the failure to anticipate the need to compensate voluntary 
evacuees, the reluctance to offer lump sum payments to those unable to 
return home for multiple years, and the large population of individuals and 
families (over 100,000 people) who continue to live in temporary housing. 
When one steps back from those criticisms, however, and looks more 
broadly at the how the compensation system has functioned, there is also 
some good news. Chart 2 shows the number of compensation claims 
submitted to TEPCO as of April, 2015, and how they have been handled.  
                                                 
37 The category of ‘emotional distress’ used in the Interim Guidelines was 
borrowed from Japan’s system of automobile accident compensation. It is a somewhat 
lumpy category, and the Interim Guidelines note that the money paid under this category 
is meant to cover the increased living expenses of evacuees.  
38 See JAPAN’S COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE (OECD), supra 
note 15, at 56 (chart describing determination of damage in areas subject to government 
instruction). 
39 Minpō [Minpō] [Civ. C.] art. 710 (Japan). 
40 The Preliminary and Interim Guidelines issued by the Dispute Reconciliation 
Committee discuss why such destabilization could lead to mental anguish. See e.g., 
JAPAN’S COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE (OECD), supra note 15, at 95, 
107, 117 & 133. 
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Chart 2: Applications and Payouts under TEPCO’s Direct Compensation Scheme41 
There are several things that are particularly notable about these 
figures. First, the number of cases that have so far been processed through 
the direct route to compensation is extraordinary—almost 2.4 million 
claims. Such a result is not just a matter of stamping a paper and putting it 
in a drawer. The process, at least in theory, means that the identity of the 
claimant is verified, the evidence submitted is reviewed, the nature of the 
losses is evaluated, a decision is made about how much compensation is 
appropriate, and a check is cut. Creating an administrative structure that can 
accomplish such a task is an impressive feat. When dealing with a volume 
of claims of this magnitude, some degree of criticism is inevitable. Indeed, 
what is perhaps surprising is not that there is so much criticism, but that 
there is so little. 
The second notable feature of the table is that there is a significant 
gap between the number of claims submitted and the total number of 
permanent (as opposed to short term) payouts. Looking only at individual 
claims, there appears to be 89,000 claims that were submitted but not yet 
compensated (749,000 compared to 660,000). It is not clear how many of 
those claims are waiting to be processed, how many have been withdrawn 
or rejected, or how many involve financial offers refused by claimants. 
However, there are surely some that have not been deemed eligible for 
compensation and which may have led claimants to seek compensation 
through ADR or litigation, as discussed below. 
                                                 
41 TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, CHART: RECORDS OF APPLICATIONS AND 
PAYOUTS FOR INDEMNIFICATION OF NUCLEAR DAMAGE (Jan. 5, 2015), 
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/comp/images/jisseki-e.pdf. 
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Third, the table provides the gross amount paid as compensation but 
does not tell us how well or how fairly particular claimants have been 
compensated. Inevitably, there are people who believe that they have 
received less than they deserve, which may be one factor leading to what 
appears to be an increase in litigation (infra Section V.C.). 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, one cannot help but notice 
the amount in the bottom line. So far, TEPCO has paid out close to five 
trillion yen in compensation. That is a staggering figure, made more so by 
the fact that the NDCA stipulates that TEPCO, like other nuclear energy 
plant owners/operators, must have resources available to pay only 120 
billion yen in compensation. There is quite a gap between the mandated 
insurance coverage/indemnity contract and the payouts; so far, total payouts 
are more than forty times greater than TEPCO’s liability limit, and much 
more will likely be paid in future months and years. The obvious 
consequence of owing far more than insurance will cover (and far more than 
the company can afford) is insolvency, but TEPCO has not declared 
bankruptcy.42 Instead, thanks to a provision of the NDCA that invites the 
government to cover the cost of excess payments in the event of a nuclear 
accident, the Japanese government has decided that providing TEPCO with 
financial support is consistent with and necessary to achieve the NDCA’s 
objectives. The government has issued a series of bonds to raise funds for 
TEPCO, in return for which TEPCO is responsible both for repayment and 
for administering the compensation fund.43 Opinions vary as to why the 
government has saved TEPCO from insolvency, but perhaps the most 
compelling explanation is that without TEPCO the government would be 
left with the task of running the compensation system by itself, a task that 
is not only unappealing and expensive but also one that puts the government 
in the position of directly paying the Fukushima disaster victims and 
implicitly (at least to some) taking responsibility for the accident. 
TEPCO’s direct compensation system is handling a massive volume 
of claims, and it has made and will continue to make significant payouts. 
That said, it is not the only way for nuclear accident victims to receive 
compensation. Those who are dissatisfied with TEPCO’s compensation 
system, who do not want to be supplicants to TEPCO, who think TEPCO’s 
compensation categories are too narrow, or who think that the amount of 
compensation is too low, can seek compensation through two other systems. 
They can bring their claims to the alternative dispute resolution system, or 
they can sue.  
                                                 
42 Hatsuru Morita, Rescuing Victims and Rescuing TEPCO: A Legal and Political 
Analysis of the TEPCO Bailout (Mar. 21, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2026868. 
43 Id. 
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B. Alternative Dispute Resolution 
In addition to the ‘direct’ route to compensation, the NDCA also 
provides for a second compensation mechanism known as alternative 
dispute resolution. Whereas the ‘direct’ route is thought of as the dominant, 
conventional approach to Fukushima compensation and the ADR program 
as the designated alternative, both approaches to compensation are 
alternatives to bringing one’s claims to the courts. The NDCA makes clear 
that in the aftermath of a nuclear accident the government can set up and 
operate a dispute resolution center that provides claimants with an 
alternative to seeking compensation from the owners/operators of nuclear 
power plants. Fukushima’s ADR system was created in May 2011 under the 
auspices of MEXT, the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology.44 It began to operate in September 2011, with a 
head office in Tokyo and a number of branch offices in the Fukushima area. 
The ADR system was designed to handle cases that did not fit neatly under 
TEPCO’s compensation criteria and instead required particular attention. It 
has also been used by those not happy with TEPCO’s payments and by those 
who do not want to engage with TEPCO in any way. The system relies on a 
group of approximately 200 attorneys who serve part-time as mediators, and 
on junior lawyers who serve as investigators. Although the initial design 
called for mediators to work in panels of three, as caseloads increased 
mediators ended up working individually.45  
The ADR process begins when claimants—both individuals and 
groups—submit a relatively short and simple claim form. An investigator 
then reviews and researches the claim and invites claimants to a mediation 
session.46 In the early days of the ADR process most claimants were not 
represented by attorneys, but increasingly claimants have had legal 
representation at mediation sessions.47 Mediators generally make a proposal 
at the initial mediation session, and if a claimant rejects it a second round 
of mediation follows. The substantive rules that govern mediators’ 
determinations of eligibility and compensation come in part from the 
Interim Guidelines followed by TEPCO in providing ‘direct’ compensation. 
Mediators additionally follow fourteen ‘General Standards’ created 
specifically by the ADR administrators to guide decision-making.48 The 
                                                 
44 Eric A. Feldman, “No Alternative: Resolving Disputes Japanese Style,” in 
Joachim Zekoll, Moritz Balz, and Iwo Amelung, eds, Formalisation and Flexibilisation in 
Dispute Resolution, Boston: Brill, 2014, p. 144. 
45 Id. 
46 These sessions can be done in person, by phone, or via teleconference. 
47 In 2014, almost 40% of ADR claimants had legal counsel. Business Overview 
of Nuclear Damages Dispute Resolution Center, MEXT.GO.JP, 
http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/genshi_baisho/jiko_baisho/detail/1347876.htm. 
48 For a detailed, nuanced discussion of the General Standards, and Fukushima 
ADR generally, see Daniel H. Foote, “Japan’s ADR System for Resolving Nuclear Power-
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General Standards are interpretations of the TEPCO guidelines that provide 
mediators with more flexibility than afforded by the guidelines 
themselves.49 As a result, mediators have, for example: extended emotional 
distress payments beyond the time period stipulated by the guidelines; 
suggested some individualization in emotional distress payments (for 
example, to pregnant women); provided damages to those who voluntarily 
evacuated even when such damages were not provided for under the 
guidelines; and dealt with financial loss suffered by various types of 
businesses, such as those catering to foreign tourists.50 
Compared to TEPCO’s direct compensation system, the ADR 
scheme has heard relatively few cases. As of April 10, 2015, 15,831 ADR 
applications had been filed and 12,809 had been closed, leaving 3,022 cases 
pending.51 Of the closed cases, 10,636 were settled, 1,094 were withdrawn, 
1,078 were closed without settlement, and 1 was rejected.52 Of the pending 
cases, 372 had settlement proposals under consideration and 2,650 
settlement discussions were ongoing.53  
Predictably, not everyone is satisfied with the ADR system. 
Complaints come from those who find it difficult to locate the 
documentation and records requested by mediators, who are unhappy about 
the location of mediation sites (particularly those living in temporary 
housing who lack private transportation), and who are critical of the slow 
pace of mediation, which was originally expected to take a maximum of 
three months but often takes longer.54 Some also complain that ADR 
mediators too rigidly follow the substantive standards developed for direct 
compensation, which they believe are too low and overly restrictive. They 
express additional concern about whether mediators are being consistent in 
their judgments and treating like cases alike.55 
In July 2014, a more acute criticism arose. Evidence surfaced that 
ADR system administrators had instructed mediators to discount their 
awards by 50%, first determining claimants’ losses and then compensating 
only half of that determination.56 That revelation infuriated some ADR 
                                                 
Related Damage Disputes,” unpublished manuscript on file with author, 2012. 
49 Id.   
50 Id. 
51 Nuclear Damages Dispute Resolution Center, MEXT.GO.JP, 
http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/genshi_baisho/jiko_baisho/detail/1329118.htm. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Feldman, supra note 15, at 352. 
55 See generally, Foote, supra note 48.  
56 ADR center cheating on victims, WWW.FUKUSHIMA-IS-STILL-NEWS.COM (July 
21, 2014) http://www.fukushima-is-still-news.com/article-adr-center-cheating-on-victims-
124201522.html; Nuclear disaster evacuee compensation halved across board: internal 
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claimants, particularly because it followed statements by ADR officials 
denying the existence of an internal document that established a “50% 
rule.” It has been reported that the ADR administrators justified the 50% 
rule internally by pointing to the need to decide cases quickly, without 
witnesses, rather than conducting a full investigation into the cause and 
extent of claimants’ harms.57 Indeed, the ADR Center has made clear that 
it is unable to solicit or even fully take into account expert medical opinion 
because it would slow down the process of evaluating claims, which means 
that damages are determined in most cases without any input from medical 
experts.58  
In at least some cases, compensation paid via ADR is thought to be 
lower than compensation that would be paid by courts. In addition, 
relatively little total compensation has been paid through ADR—JPY 175.3 
billion as of February 2015, which amounts to less than 4% of that paid by 
TEPCO.59 As a result, some claimants who believe that they have suffered 
significant loss as a result of the nuclear accident have decided that their 
best option may be to bring their claims to court, which may help to explain 
the increase in litigation against TEPCO since 2012. 
C. Litigation 
Of the millions of people affected by the 3/11 disaster, only those 
whose harms were caused by the nuclear accident, not the tsunami or 
earthquake, are eligible to apply for compensation from TEPCO or via the 
government’s ADR system. The courts, however, are open to all: those who 
are dissatisfied with how their compensation claims have been resolved by 
TEPCO; those who believe that their ADR awards are too low; those whose 
harms were caused by the nuclear accident but do not want to submit their 
claims to TEPCO or to ADR; those who believe that they have suffered 
compensable harms that were not caused by the nuclear accident; those who 
want to use litigation as an opportunity to express their anger and publicize 
                                                 
document, FUKUSHIMAEMERGENCYWHATCANWEDO.COM (Aug. 31, 2014), 
https://citizenperth.wordpress.com/2014/09/01/nuclear-disaster-evacuee-compensation-
halved-across-board-internal-document/. 
57 See What is the Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) and what does it mean to 
the victims of Fukushima, EVACUATE-FUKUSHIMA.COM (July 28, 2014), 
http://www.evacuate-fukushima.com/2014/07/what-is-the-alternative-dispute-resolution-
adr/.  
58 Gov’t dispute resolution proposed smaller compensasion by ignoring the 
opinions of victim’s doctors, FUKUSHIMAONTHEGLOBE.com (July 21, 2014), 
http://fukushimaontheglobe.com/citizens_movement/litigation-movement/3814.html; 
“Hibakusha” cheated on compensation & experts opinions skipped by ADR, EVACUATE-
FUKUSHIMA.COM (July 24, 2014), http://www.evacuate-
fukushima.com/2014/07/confirmed-hibakusha-adr-opinion-experts-skipped/. 
59 New Comprehensive Special Business Plan, NDF.GO.JP (January 14, 2014), 
http://www.ndf.go.jp/gyomu/tokujikei/kaitei20150415.pdf. 
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what they see as government and/or corporate malfeasance; and, others. The 
result is that various claims have been filed on behalf of individuals and 
groups seeking compensation for harms allegedly caused by the events of 
3/11.60 
So far, plaintiffs have brought a number of different types of cases 
to the courts. Some involve individual Japanese plaintiffs and are filed in 
Japanese courts. Others involve groups of plaintiffs aggregated into a single 
claim.61 Still others have been filed as class actions with courts in the United 
States. The substance of the claims also varies. Some plaintiffs who believe 
that they were harmed by the nuclear accident have sought to sidestep the 
1961 NDCA Act, which imposes strict liability on nuclear operators, and 
have instead brought negligence claims against TEPCO under Section 709 
of Japan’s Civil Code. Such plaintiffs have demanded full compensation 
from TEPCO as calculated under the court’s civil liability rules, which 
plaintiffs believe will exceed the payouts under either ADR or TEPCO’s 
‘direct’ compensation system. In addition, plaintiffs in some cases have 
insisted that TEPCO adopt preventative measures to ensure that future 
nuclear accidents do not occur and that the company apologize for the 
accident;62 have argued that the courts should reject the distinction between 
mandatory and voluntary evacuees when determining victim compensation; 
and have based civil tort claims on the argument that TEPCO interfered with 
the right to “wholesome and cultured living” (Article 25 of the Constitution 
of Japan) and to develop their personalities (Article 13 of the Constitution 
of Japan). 
The barriers to succeeding in these types of cases are considerable. 
As with negligence claims more generally, many of the key legal issues 
involve questions of foreseeability (e.g., was a disaster of the magnitude of 
3/11 foreseeable?) and causation (e.g., was the plaintiff’s depression caused 
by the disaster, or was the plaintiff previously depressed?). Assessing 
damages is also extremely difficult, particularly in cases that involve 
exposure to radiation that poses long-term risks or cases concerning those 
who are unable to return to their contaminated homes for a long period of 
time. Other novel legal questions are also raised by these claims. One of 
TEPCO’s arguments, for example, is that by imposing strict liability on 
                                                 
60 It is difficult to know how many claims have been filed, since they can be 
brought to courts any place in Japan and there is no centralized database of filed cases.  
61 Although recently legislation has created a class action mechanism in Japan, it 
will not come into force until 2016. Until then, no class action procedure is available to 
Japanese plaintiffs.  
62 Eri Osaka, Toden no Sekinin: Sekinin Konkyo ni Kansuru Rironteki Kento 
[Theoretical Analysis of the Legal Basis of TEPCO’s Liability] in FUKUSHIMA GENPATSU 
JIKO BAISHO NO KENKYU [RESEARCH ON FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT 
COMPENSATION] (Takehisa Awaji et al. eds., 2015). 
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nuclear power plant owners/operators, the NDCA precludes fault-based 
claims, an assertion that has not previously been considered by the Japanese 
courts. The constitutional claims are also challenging, since Articles 13 and 
25 of the Constitution are generally seen as hortatory provisions that do not 
provide plaintiffs with specific remedies.  
One highly publicized lawsuit was brought to the Fukushima 
District Court by the survivors of a 58-year old female evacuee, Hamako 
Watanabe, who had to leave her house a month after the nuclear meltdown, 
returned to visit her contaminated home in July 2011, and soon after self-
immolated.63 Prior to the Fukushima accident Mrs. Watanabe had been a 
chicken farmer, but after the accident she could no longer work and was 
separated from her children as well as from her neighbors. It also appears 
that before the nuclear meltdown she suffered from insomnia and was being 
treated for what the court described as ‘psychosomatic disorders’.  
In August 2014, the court issued a ruling in a lawsuit brought by 
Mrs. Watanabe’s surviving husband and three children, finding a causal link 
between the stress of evacuation and her suicide.64 The court attributed 80% 
of her suicide to Fukushima-related stress and ordered TEPCO to pay the 
family 49 million yen.65 According to the court, TEPCO should have 
foreseen that in the event of a nuclear accident people would be forced to 
evacuate, and that some evacuees would become depressed and possibility 
suicidal. TEPCO sought to challenge the causal link between the nuclear 
meltdown and the plaintiff’s suicide by pointing to her history of 
psychological issues and arguing that her past psychological problems 
bespoke emotional fragility. The court, however, found that people’s 
reactions to stress exist on a broad spectrum and argued that the legal claims 
of those particularly prone to react strongly to stressful situations deserved 
a sympathetic hearing. 
As a simple matter of logic and legal doctrine, TEPCO was clearly 
correct to argue that if the plaintiff was emotionally unstable before the 
nuclear meltdown then the meltdown could not be considered the cause of 
her emotional instability. Whether she was suicidal prior to the accident is 
unclear, but if she was, that fact would clearly be relevant to TEPCO’s 
liability for her death. Nonetheless, TEPCO was strongly criticized by the 
press for investigating Mrs. Watanabe’s emotional state. An editorial 
published soon after the court issued its judgment, stated: 
                                                 
63 Fukushima Suicide Victim’s Family Wins Damages, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 26, 
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/aug/26/fukushima-suicide-victim-
family-damages-tepco-hamako-watanabe. 
64 Id. 
65 This was the first case in which TEPCO was ordered to pay a claimant. 
Editorial: Ruling on Nuclear Evacuee Suicide Holds TEPCO Accountable, MAINICHI.JP 
(August 27, 2014), 
http://mainichi.jp/english/english/perspectives/news/20140827p2a00m0na017000c.html.  
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In Watanabe's lawsuit, TEPCO effectively hinted at the 
weakness of her character as the cause of her suicide. The 
utility ought to be thoroughly ashamed of itself for making 
such an allegation. Whether she was strong or weak is 
irrelevant. There is no excuse for causing Watanabe so much 
stress as to drive her to suicide. Since every suicide involves 
a range of factors, such as problems with health or family 
relations, it is never easy to determine the exact cause. Still, 
since Watanabe's case occurred while she and her family 
were living as evacuees, there is no question that the nuclear 
disaster had either a direct or indirect effect on her decision.66 
Because TEPCO decided not to appeal the District Court decision, 
the legal theory underlying the case has not been fully ventilated.67 As a 
result, the long-term impact of the case is not yet clear. If other courts are 
similarly sympathetic to claims brought on behalf of evacuees who have 
committed suicide, however, TEPCO will be facing a considerable financial 
burden. So far, aside from a suicide case TEPCO settled with the family of 
a farmer, no other cases involving suicide have been resolved. But other 
cases may be in the pipeline. Estimates from the central government’s 
Cabinet Office indicate that there were fifty-six earthquake-related suicides 
in Fukushima Prefecture between June 2011 and July 2014, thirty in Iwate 
Prefecture, and thirty-seven in Miyagi Prefecture.68 The press has suggested 
that the figure could be much higher, noting that 1,670 people in Fukushima 
have died from suicide since the 3/11 disaster.69 Given that that there are 
still over 100,000 people living as evacuees, it is possible that those figures 
may unfortunately continue to rise. If courts remain sympathetic to the view 
that evacuation is a presumptive cause of suicide, TEPCO is likely to face 
additional liability.70  
                                                 
66 Editorial: Society must find ways to reduce stress of Fukushima survivors, THE 
ASAHI SHIMBUN (Aug. 27, 2014), 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201408270026. 
67 Tepco won’t appeal civil ruling on evacuee’s suicide, JAPAN TIMES (September 
6, 2014), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/09/06/national/tepco-wont-appeal-civil-
ruling-on-evacuees-suicide/#.VX43_vlVhBc. 
68 Suicides are considered earthquake related if they take place in temporary 
housing and involve evacuees.  See generally Fukushima suicides on the rise, FUKUSHIMA-
IS-STILL-NEWS.COM, (March 13, 2014), http://www.fukushima-is-still-news.com/article-
fukushima-suicides-on-the-rise-122952125.html; Suicides on the rise in disaster-struck 
Fukushima, SPUTNIKNEWS.COM (March 13, 2014), 
6281/http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/news/2014_03_13/Suicides-tied-to-
Fukushima-disaster-are-on-rise-6281/. 
69 Editorial: Ruling on Nuclear Evacuee Suicide Holds TEPCO Accountable, 
supra note 65. 
70 Indeed, it may be that TEPCO has already been privately settling such cases in 
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At least fifteen individual claims against employers and schools 
have also been filed on behalf of those killed by the tsunami, two of which 
have resulted in favorable judgments for plaintiffs. The first decision was 
issued in September 2013 in a negligence case brought by four families 
against a private kindergarten. The school was located on a hill and was 
undamaged by the tsunami. In the aftermath of the earthquake, it boarded a 
group of children on a bus that drove from the school down toward the sea, 
leading to the deaths of the children.71 The Sendai District Court found that 
the school staff should have foreseen that a tsunami would follow the 
earthquake, and therefore breached its duty to safely evacuate the children. 
It ordered the school to pay 177 million yen to the families.72 The school 
appealed the ruling to the Sendai High Court, which oversaw a settlement 
under which the school acknowledged its legal responsibility, apologized, 
and paid 60 million yen in damages to the families in December 2014. 
A second judgment in favor of tsunami victims was reached in 
January 2015, when the Sendai District Court awarded 1.9 billion yen in 
damages to the surviving relatives of twenty-five students and one part-time 
employee of a private driving school.73 As in the case involving the private 
kindergarten, the court focused on the question of whether the defendants 
could have foreseen that a tsunami would occur after the 3/11 earthquake 
and again answered in the affirmative. According to the judge, the school 
“had a duty to foresee the tsunami and transport the students to safety.”74 
Instead, despite evacuation announcements by fire fighters, the school kept 
the plaintiff students at the school for an hour after the earthquake before 
deciding to evacuate, resulting in the deaths of the students.75  
In another case brought by two families whose children were killed 
by the tsunami, the same court reached a different conclusion. The case 
involved a group of students at a public daycare center who were kept at the 
center for over an hour after the earthquake and then evacuated in a car that 
                                                 
an effort to keep them out of court. 
71 Peter Shadbolt, Japanese Kindergarten Ordered to Pay $1.8 million over 
Tsunami Deaths, CNN.COM (Sep. 18, 2013, 12:55AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/18/world/asia/japan-tsunami-damages/. 
72 Court Rules Kindergarten Liable for Sending Children Home Who Died in 
Tsunami, THE ASAHI SHIMBUN (Sep. 17, 2013), 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/quake_tsunami/AJ201309170084. 
73 Miyagi Driving School Ordered to Pay Damages Over 3/11 Tsunami Deaths, 
JAPAN TIMES (Jan, 13, 2015), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/01/13/national/crime-legal/miyagi-driving-
school-ordered-to-pay-damages-over-311-tsunami-deaths/. 
74 Id. 
75 Court Rules Driving School Responsible for 26 Tsunami-Related Deaths, THE 
ASAHI SHIMBUN (JAN. 14, 2015), 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/quake_tsunami/AJ201501140038. 
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was caught up in the tsunami, leading to their death. The school claims that 
a local government official ordered them to remain at the school, but the 
official denied the accusation. Two families sued the town that operated the 
school and demanded 88 million yen in compensation. The Sendai District 
Court rejected their claim, finding that local officials could not have 
predicted the tsunami.76 The parents appealed to the Sendai High Court, 
which recommended a 3 million yen settlement. One family accepted the 
offer, along with a statement from the town that it “will view with 
seriousness the fact that children died and make efforts for safe daycare 
services in the future.”77 The other family rejected the settlement and lost 
its appeal to the High Court. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court 
in April 2015.  
The Sendai District Court was also not swayed by the arguments of 
three families whose relatives worked for a local bank and were killed by 
the tsunami. The families demanded compensation of 235 million yen, 
arguing that the bank’s evacuation plan, which was to tell employees to 
climb up to the roof of their ten meter high building, was inadequate, since 
there was a designated evacuation site less than 300 meters from the bank.78 
The court found that the bank’s evacuation plan was reasonable and that the 
bank could not have foreseen the tsunami. After the Sendai High Court 
rejected their appeal, the families appealed to the Supreme Court in May 
2015. 
The first of what could become a flood of claims brought by workers 
exposed to radiation at the Fukushima Daiichi reactor was filed in March 
2014 in the Fukushima District Court.79 In that case, a worker employed by 
TEPCO accused the company of negligently exposing him to high levels of 
radiation and demanded 11 million yen in compensation. So far, the worker 
has experienced no ill health consequences due to the alleged exposure, and 
the case has not yet been decided. 
Of even greater significance than individual claims brought in the 
aftermath of 3/11 are aggregated claims filed on behalf of groups of 
plaintiffs. As of March 2015, there were over twenty such cases, none of 
                                                 
76 Miyagi Town Settles over Toddler’s Tsunami Death, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 24, 
2014), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/12/24/national/crime-legal/miyagi-town-
settles-toddlers-tsunami-death/#.VSwYNaPD8uU. 
77 Judicial Process Wears out Parents Seeking Truth about Tsunami Deaths, THE 
ASAHI SHIMBUN (Dec. 24, 2014), 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/quake_tsunami/AJ201412240043. 
78 Sendai Court Upholds Ruling Bank Not Responsible for Employees’ Tsunami 
Deaths, JAPAN TODAY (Apr. 24, 2015), 
http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/view/sendai-court-upholds-ruling-bank-
not-responsible-for-employees-tsunami-deaths. 
79 Fukushima Worker Files Historic Lawsuit Over Radiation Exposure, RT.COM 
(May 8, 2014), http://rt.com/news/157668-fukushima-worker-lawsuit-radiation/. 
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which had yet reached a judgment or settlement. The map in Chart 3 
provides an overview of some of the key cases filed as of January 31, 2015, 
and the number of plaintiffs in each case.80 A more detailed (but less current) 
list of cases is included in Appendix 1.  
Chart 3: Map of Key Cases 
Most of the aggregated cases were filed in 2013 and 2014, and they 
share a number of key features. In almost every case, claims are brought 
against two defendants—the Japanese government and TEPCO. Plaintiffs 
are generally families or individuals who evacuated after the nuclear 
accident and are living in temporary housing. Some lived in mandatory 
evacuation zones and others evacuated voluntarily. The majority of 
                                                 
80 Kenji Oota, Genpatsu Jiko Songai Baisho Seikyu Sosho no Genjou to Kadai, 
[Current Situation and Challenges of Nuclear Damage Compensation Litigation], 66 JIYU 
TO SEIGI 16, 2015 (based on a map originally created by Hiroyuki Kakizaki and Maiko 
Kudo).  
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claimants are seeking compensation for several types of harms, including 
physical injury, property loss, and emotional distress, with demands that 
greatly exceed payments offered by TEPCO’s ‘direct’ payments or ADR 
procedures (in one case the demand is for 30 million yen per person for 
emotional distress, in contrast to the typical award of 100,000 yen/month 
from TEPCO or through ADR). In some cases, those unable to return to 
their homes are asking courts to impose liability on defendants for new 
domiciles—including the cost of land, construction, and home furnishing—
which plaintiffs in one case set at 36 million yen. In cases involving multiple 
defendants, the total requested damages quickly add up, exceeding 20 
billion yen in one case. 
In addition to lawsuits filed within Japan, three class action lawsuits 
have been brought to courts in the United States. Two similar claims, both 
filed by a New York firm on March 10, 2014 (one day before the statute of 
limitations expired), asserted that General Electric, GE-Hitachi Nuclear 
Energy International LLC, and their subsidiaries/affiliates, were liable 
under negligence and product liability law for recklessly building and 
supplying the nuclear reactors used by TEPCO.81 In one of the suits, 
evacuated Japanese plaintiffs sought compensatory damages, punitive 
damages, medical monitoring, and attorneys’ fees for harms including 
personal injury, emotional distress, property damage, business interruption, 
and economic loss.82 With a claimed $3 million in injuries for each plaintiff, 
and a plaintiff’s group that could have potentially included tens of thousands 
of claimants, the total value of the claims amounted to billions of dollars. In 
July 2014, however, the case was discontinued without prejudice, and its 
future remains uncertain.83 The other case was brought on behalf of two 
businesses that were allegedly harmed by the nuclear accident, demanding 
$5 million for each plaintiff to compensate them for property damage and a 
variety of economic harms resulting from loss of business.84 It too was 
discontinued without prejudice in July 2014.85 
The third case, filed in December 2012, is Cooper et al v. Tokyo 
Electric Power Company, Inc. The case is a class action brought on behalf 
of those who took part in Operation Tomodachi, during which the crew of 
the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan provided support off the coast of Fukushima after 
                                                 
81 Okura Mitsuru v. General Electric Co., Docket No. 152082/2014 (N.Y. Sup Ct., 
filed Mar. 10, 2014); Sasaki Body Ltd v. General Electric Co., Docket No. 152107/2014 
(N.Y. Sup Ct., filed Mar. 10, 2014). 
82 Okura Mitsuru v. General Electric Co., supra note 81. 
83 Notice of Voluntary Discontinuance Without Prejudice, Okura Mitsuru v. 
General Electric Co., Docket No. 152082/2014 (N.Y. Sup. July 2, 2014).  
84 Sasaki Body Ltd. V. General Electric Co., supra note 81. 
85 Notice of Voluntary Discontinuance Without Prejudice, Sasaki Body Ltd. V. 
General Electric Co., Docket No. 152107/2014 (N.Y. Sup. July 2, 2014). 
152 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal Vol. 16:2 
the nuclear accident.86 The plaintiffs are demanding $10 million USD in 
compensatory damages and $30 million USD in punitive damages for each 
claimant, as well as a fund of at least $100 million USD to cover the cost of 
medical exams and medical monitoring. Because the original claim alleged 
in part that TEPCO had conspired with the Japanese Government to 
minimize the severity of the nuclear meltdown, the court found that the 
claim raised non-justiciable political questions and dismissed it without 
prejudice.87 As a result, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in February, 
2014, arguing that they were exposed to high levels of radiation during the 
relief mission as a result of TEPCO’s negligence in siting, designing, 
constructing, and operating the Fukushima Daiichi plant.88 The amended 
complaint avoided reference to the actions of the Japanese government, but 
included strict liability and intentional infliction of emotional distress 
causes of action. TEPCO’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint 
persuaded the court to reject the plaintiffs’ strict liability and emotional 
distress arguments, but the court allowed the primary negligence claim to 
go forward.89 The court also permitted the plaintiffs to add four additional 
defendants to the claim—General Electric, EBASCO, Toshiba, and 
Hitachi—as well as additional plaintiffs. As of mid-2015, the Cooper case 
continues to work its way through the Southern District of California, 
threatening TEPCO and other defendants with significant liability. The 
requested relief includes a minimum of $1 billion USD for medical 
monitoring, as well as economic, noneconomic, and punitive damages for 
all plaintiffs.90 
VI. CONCLUSION 
With the catastrophic events at Fukushima almost five years 
removed, it is time to look back and take stock of Japan’s approach to 
disaster compensation. How well has Japan’s approach to post-Fukushima 
                                                 
86 Cooper et al v. Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc., Docket No. 3:12-cv-03032 
(S.D. Cal., filed Dec 21, 2012).  
87 Order Granting 26 Motion to Dismiss, Cooper v. TEPCO, 3:12-cv-03023 (S.D. 
Cal., Nov 26, 2013). (“The Court grants TEPCO's motion to dismiss. The dismissal is 
without prejudice to Plaintiffs filing an amended pleading…” Signed by Judge Janis L. 
Sammartino on 11/26/2013). 
88 Second Amended Complaint for Damages, Cooper v. TEPCO, 3:12-cv-03023 
(S.D. Cal., Feb. 2014).  
89 Order (1) Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, 
(2) Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Under Forum Non Conveniens and 
International Comity, and (3) Granting Leave to Amend, Cooper v. TEPCO, 3:12-cv-03023 
(S.D. Cal., Oct. 28, 2014). Third Amended Complaint for Damages, Cooper v. TEPCO, 
3:12-cv-03023 (S.D.Cal., Nov. 18, 2014).  
90 Cooper et al v. Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc., Docket No. 3:12-cv-03032 
(S.D. Cal., filed Dec 21, 2012. 
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compensation worked? How might it be improved? What can other nations 
learn from Japan’s experience with 3/11 about compensating disaster 
victims?  
From one perspective, the Japanese approach has been remarkably 
successful. Although the magnitude of the disaster ensures that there will be 
some dissatisfaction with whatever approach to compensation is utilized, 
the data from Japan indicates that TEPCO has been able to process an 
extraordinary volume of compensation claims and has provided funds to 
most claimants. With over 5 trillion yen paid to more than 2.4 million 
claimants, one would be hard pressed to find a post disaster compensation 
program that has dispersed so much money to such a large group of people. 
Moreover, Fukushima victims have access not just to TEPCO’s 
compensation program but also to the ADR system, which has processed 
another fifteen thousand cases. Litigation also remains a viable and 
increasingly utilized option, both for individuals and for groups with claims 
not covered by either of the extrajudicial programs, or by those who are 
unhappy with what those programs have yielded. 
But there is an alternative evaluation that is far less optimistic. From 
that perspective, the post-Fukushima compensation process is rooted in an 
unjust distinction between deserving victims (of the nuclear meltdown) and 
undeserving ones (of the earthquake and tsunami). Compensation awards 
are based upon suspect and opaque criteria, and are allocated through an 
overlapping set of cumbersome procedures that have cost far more than 
TEPCO can afford and have burdened public funds. Too few victims have 
been adequately compensated despite supplicating themselves before 
TEPCO, which exacerbates their anger at the company for its role in the 
nuclear accident. The alternative process of ADR created to supplement 
TEPCO’s compensation program is too slow and stingy to fill the gaps left 
by TEPCO. Increasing amounts of litigation signal growing dissatisfaction 
with these compensation mechanisms, but offers no real alternative for the 
great majority of Fukushima victims. 
Although Japan’s approach to post-Fukushima compensation 
warrants criticism, few if any other nations would have done much better. 
In the absence of robust transnational institutions that assist with disaster 
compensation, countries must go it alone, and for the most part they have 
failed to be proactive in developing compensation strategies.91 When it 
comes to compensation for natural disasters, the closest any nation comes 
to having an inclusive strategy is France, which has de facto mandatory 
                                                 
91 See, e.g., Roger Van den Bergh & Michael Faure, Compulsory Insurance of 
Loss to Property Caused by Natural Disasters: Competition or Solidarity, 29 WORLD 
COMPETITION 25, 28-31 (2006) (describing three different schemes employed by different 
countries in Europe for compensation of property damage caused by natural disasters); 
FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
APPROACH (Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief, eds., 2006) (describing disaster compensation 
in several European countries and the US). 
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disaster insurance.92 The French system has much to applaud, but it could 
not have withstood the financial strain imposed by a disaster of the 
magnitude experienced in Japan. The US has a variety of federal and state 
policies aimed at specific types of disasters, but no comprehensive disaster 
compensation program.93 Like Japan, the US does not routinely compensate 
natural disaster victims, and if a Fukushima-like event were to occur in the 
US it is unlikely that the government would do much more than in Japan, 
and possibly less. Large-scale disasters create large pools of victims, and 
the cost of compensating those victims exceeds what nations are willing or 
able to pay. 
 Developing a policy for the compensation of victims of nuclear 
disasters is somewhat easier. As discussed above, there are a number of 
multilateral agreements that establish compensation guidelines, as well as 
national legislation like Japan’s NDCA and the US Price-Anderson Act that 
echo the international agreements.94 Unfortunately, the mandated insurance 
liability limits in all of them are egregiously low. In the event of a serious 
accident all would fall as far short of covering the real cost of the accident 
as did the NDCA—which mandated a 120 billion yen fund but has been 
faced with more than forty times that amount (and growing) in 
compensation costs.  
For all its faults, Japan’s approach to compensating the victims of 
the 3/11 disaster appears to be no worse than what would have occurred in 
many other nations, and perhaps better than what one would find in more 
resource-constrained nations. That is, perhaps, damning with faint praise. 
Japan, one might hope, could do a better job of taking care of the victims of 
mass disaster. So too could the rest of the world. 
                                                 
92 Van den Bergh, supra note 91, at 30-31. 
93 See generally, Robert L. Rabin & Suzanne A. Bratis, United States, in 
FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
APPROACH (Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief, eds., 2006). 
94 See supra SECTION IV: JAPAN’S NUCLEAR LIABILITY SYSTEM. 
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APPENDIX I. GROUP LITIGATION AGAINST TEPCO AND THE JAPANESE 
GOVERNMENT95 
 
 
                                                 
95 Assembled by Yoko Okado (on file with author). 
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